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INTRODUCTION

Recently, a man was sitting inside the living room of his South Carolina
home watching a basketball game when his wife arrived.1 According to the
police report, he was visibly drunk and became upset with her.2 He never

1. Brooke Whitson, You Can Get Arrestedffor Wiat', WMBF NEWS, http://www.wmbf
news. com/story/ 18873650/you-can-get-arrested-for-wThat (last updated Aug. 20, 2012, 12:19 PM).
2.
Id.
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physically touched her, but he "did admit to yeiling and moving several objects
out of the way."
The police arrived, handcuffed him, and booked him on
disorderly house charges, which "appl[y] when the conduct of its inhabitants is
such as to become a public nuisance."
Imagine finding yourself, as this South Carolina man did, behind bars for
something you did not even know was illegal-namely, having a few drinks and
knocking over items in your home. Further, imagine that upon entering the
detention center after being arrested for this unusual charge, you were subjected
to a full-body strip search. Had this scenario taken place in Burlington County,
New Jersey-as opposed to South Carolina-a strip search would indeed have
been the result.
A strip search involves "squatting, bending one's buttocks, and in the case of
male inmates-lifting one's genitalia." 6 In the recent case of Florence v. Board
of Chosen Freeholders,"the United States Supreme Court held that suspicionless
strip searches of detainees being admitted to the general jail population did not
violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. The arguments accepted by the
Supreme Court in finding suspicionless strip searches constitutional hinge on the
impracticability of a reasonable suspicion standard.8
Interestingly, South
Carolina county detention centers and minimum security level prisons use
variations of a reasonable suspicion standard.9 Although South Carolina has yet
to see a case concerning a detainee or inmate claiming privacy violations upon
entering a jail, that fact alone does not lead to the conclusion that a reasonable
suspicion standard is optimal.10 Arguments exist that both support and deter
blanket strip search policies in this state.
The implications of Florence in South Carolina remain debatable due to the
fact-specific nature of its holding.12 The Court cautioned that while it was
reasonable for corrections officials to decide that a reasonable suspicion standard
would be unworkable,1 this may not always be the situation. In some instances,
such a determination may be an "exaggerated" response to the circumstances.14

3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders (Florence 1), 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 502 (D.N.J.
2009). amended by 657 F. Supp. 2d 504 (D.N.J.). rev'd. 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010), aff'd, 132 S.
Ct. 1510 (2012).
6.
Id.
7.
Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders (FlorenceIl), 132 S. Ct. 1510. 1523 (2012).
8.
See id. at 1520-22.
9.
See irfia notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
10. See infla notes 154 209 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 65-111, 211-85 and accompanying text.
12. Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring) ("The Court holds that jail
administrators may require all arrestees wiho are committed to the generalpopulation of a jail to
undergo visual strip searches not involving physical contact by corrections officers.").
13. Id. at 1520.
14. Id. at 1518 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584-85 (1984)).
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This Note analyzes whether the adoption of a suspicionless strip search
policy in South Carolina would be an "exaggerated response" to the demands of
this state's incarceration system.
Because of South Carolina's explicit
constitutional right to privacy, the lack of evidence invalidating a reasonable
suspicion standard, and public policy considerations, the move to a blanket strip
search policy would neither be reasonable nor necessary in local-jurisdiction
detention centers. Part II of this Note provides the facts, procedural history, and
holding in Florence, and it also offers an analysis of what the Court determined
to be legitimate state interests. Part III gives an overview of the incarceration
framework in South Carolina. Part IV analyzes the arguments in favor of
implementing suspicionless strip searches, and Part V analyzes arguments
against such an implementation. Finally, Part VI concludes that in South
Carolina. it would not be reasonable to adopt a policy of suspicionless searches
for minor offenders.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN
FREEHOLDERS
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court held that suspicionless strip
searches of detainees being admitted to the general jail population did not violate
the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, even when the offender at issue has
committed only a minor offense.5 This Part provides the facts, procedural
history, and holding in Florence. It also analyzes those state interests that the
Court considered significant to warrant intrusion into a person's privacy rights.
4. Facts of the Case
On March 3, 2005, Albert Florence was riding as a passenger in his sport
utility vehicle in Burlington County, New Jersey.16
Upon pulling over
Florence's wife, the driver of the vehicle at the time, the state trooper noticed an
outstanding bench warrant for Florence. 1 The warrant was issued in 2003
because Florence fell behind on court-ordered payments and failed to appear at
an enforcement hearing for a prior, unrelated offense.18 Although Florence had
paid the outstanding balance less than a week after the hearing, the warrant
remained in a statewide computer database.19 After unsuccessfully protesting
the warrant's validity, 20 Florence was transported to the Burlington Jail and later

15.
16.
(D.N.J.),
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id at 1514-15, 1523.
Florence 1, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 496 (D.N.J. 2009). amended by 657 F. Supp. 2d 504
rev'd, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010). affd, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
Id.
Florence IIL 132 S. Ct. at 1514.
Id.
Florence1, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 496.
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transferred to a second county jail, the Essex County Correctional Facility.
The issue before the Court related not to his arrest or confinement in the county
jails, but rather the strip searches he experienced at each facility.22
At the Burlington County Jail, an officer ordered Florence to strip into the
nude, and while naked, "open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold his arms out, turn
fully around, and lift his genitals."23 During the search, the officer sat
approximately "arms-length" away.24 The officer then directed Florence to
shower before finally admitting him to the general jail population.
After six days of confinement at the Burlington facility, Florence was
transferred to the Essex County Corrections Facility (ECCF) and subjected to a
second suspicionless strip search.26 Upon arrival at ECCF, Florence and four
other detainees were forced to "strip naked and shower under the watchful eyes
of two corrections officers."27 Similar to the procedures at the Burlington
County Jail, the Essex Count) corrections officials required him "to open his
mouth and lift his genitals."a Unlike at Burlington, however, the ECCF officials
ordered him to turn around, squat, and cough. Jail personnel never physically
touched Florence during the intake procedure at either facility.30 Florence was
released the next day when the minor charges against him were dismissed.
B. ProceduralHistory
After he was released. Florence filed a class action lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey against both counties, both
county jails, and one warden.3 The court defined the class as:
All arrestees charged with non-indictable offenses who were processed,
housed or held-over at Defendant Burlington County Jail and/or Essex
County Correctional Facility from March 3, 2003 to the present date
who were directed by Defendants' officers to strip naked before those
officers, no matter if the officers term that procedure a 'visual

21. Florence 111, 132 S. Ct. at 1514. "The Essex County Correctional Facility. wvhere
petitioner was taken after six days, is the largest county jail in New Jersey. It admits more than
25,000 inmates each year and houses about 1,000 gang members at any given time." Id. (citation
omitted).
22. Id. at 1514-15.
23. Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 496 97.
24. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders (Florence11). 621 F.3d 296, 299 (3d Cir. 2010),
aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
25. Id.

26. Id.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1514 (2012).
Id. at 1514-15.
FlorenceII, 621 F.3d at 299.
Id.
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observation' or otherwise, without the officers first articulating a
reasonable belief that those arrestees were concealing contraband, drugs
33
or weapons.
Florence sought relief inder 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the suspicionless
strip searches violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the
United States Constitution.3
The crux of his argument was that "persons
arrested for a minor offense could not be required to remove their clothing and
expose the most private areas of their bodies to close visual inspection as a
routine part of the intake process." 35 Instead, Florence maintained that officials
should be able to "conduct this kind of search only if they had reason to suspect
a particular inmate of concealing a weapon, drugs, or other contraband."36
The district court granted Florence's motion for summary judgment
regarding the unlawful search claim-concluding that "any policy of 'strip
searching' non-indictable offenders without reasonable suspicion violated the
Fourth Amendment."3 The court also held that whether the inspections at the
facilities were labeled "visual observations" or "strip searches," the procedures
involved were still searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.38
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed.39 A majority of the divided panel
held that the procedures of the Burlington and Essex County Jails "struck a
reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the security needs of the two
jails."4 0 The court stressed the detection of contraband, identification of gang
members, and prevention of the spread of contagious diseases as the valid
penological interests justifying the strip search procedures.4 1
The decision on appeal placed the Third Circuit on one side of a split among
the federal courts of appeals regarding the issue of whether the "privacy right" of
the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion to exist before an inmate
can be strip searched by a correctional official.42 The divide arose after the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Bell v. Tolfish.43 In Bell, the Court noted
that "[i]nmates at all Bureau of Prison facilities . . . [were] required to expose

33.

Florence L 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 495 (D.N.J. 2009). amended by 657 F. Supp. 2d 504

(D.N.J.), rev'd, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010). affd, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
34.
35.
36.

Florence II,132 S. Ct. at 1514 15.
Id.
Id. at 1515.

37. Id.
38. Florence L 595 F. Supp. 2d at 503. At the Burlington County Jail, the searches were
actually labeled "visual observations." Id. at 502.
39. FlorenceII, 621 F.3d 296, 311 (3d Cir. 2010), aff'd 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
40. Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1515, (citing Florence II, 621 F.3d 296).
41. Florence II. 621 F.3d at 307.
42. FlorenceIII, 132 S. Ct. at 1518 (citing Florence II, 621 F.3d at 303-04 & n.4).

43. 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
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their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of a strip search conducted after
every contact visit with a person from outside the institution."44
The Bell Court held that because of the security interests involved in the
operation of a detention center, strip searches after contact visits were not
unreasonable and thus not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.4 In so holding,
the Court reasoned that anal and genital inspections are reasonable whenever
prison officials deem them necessary, even if the circumstances indicate no
possibility of hidden contraband.4 6 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
established and relied on a test that weighed "the need for the particular search
against the invasion of personal rights."4
The Bell decision dealt only with the issue of searches after contact visits
from outside visitors; 48 the issue of whether reasonable suspicion is a minimalthreshold requirement for strip searches of inconin inmates or pretrial
detainees was left unanswered for the lower courts.
Of the courts that
addressed the issue after Bell, eight circuit courts of appealso and various other
district courts favored inmates' rights to privacy.51 These circuits required
reasonable suspicion, at a minimum, in order to conduct a strip search at the
intake process.
Two other circuit courts of appeals held otherwise, finding
reasonable suspicion an unnecessary prerequisite to conducting a strip search.

44. Id. at 558. The strip search enabled the officers to conduct a visual cavity inspection,
including the anal cavity and genital regions. Florence 1. 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 504 (D.N.J. 2009),
amendedby 657 F. Supp. 2d 504 (D.N.J.),. rev'd. 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010), aff'd. 132 S. Ct. 1510
(2012) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 558). The stated purpose of correctional facilities in performing the
strip searches on inmates was the detection and deterrence of contraband, weapons, and drugs. Id.
(citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 558). In Bell, "[t]he question before the Supreme Court was 'whether
visual body-cavity inspections as contemplated by the ... rules can ever be conducted on less than
probable cause.'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 560).
45. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558 ("The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches, and
under the circumstances, we do not believe that these searches are unreasonable." (citing Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925)).
46. Id. at 558-60.
47. Id. at 559. The test involved considering the scope of the intrusion, the manner in which
the search is conducted, the justification behind conducting the search, and the place in which it is
undertaken. Id.
48. Id. at 528.
49. Florence1. 595 F. Supp. 2d at 504.
50. See Bull v. City of San Francisco, 539 F.3d 1193. 1201 (9th Cir. 2008); Roberts v. Rhode
Island, 239 F.3d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 2001); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 804 (2d Cir. 1986); Masters
v. Crouch. 872 F.2d 1248. 1257 (6th Cir. 1989); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739. 742 (8th Cir.
1985): Stewart v. Lubbock Cnty., Tex., 767 F.2d 153. 156-57 (5th Cir. 1985); Hill v. Bogans, 735
F.2d 391, 394 95 (10th Cir. 1984); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir.
1983); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981).
51. See. e.g., O'Brien v. Borough of Woodbury Heights, 679 F. Supp. 429, 434 (D.N.J. 1988)
(noting that in the absence any suspicion that plaintiffs were concealing a weapon, the strip searches
of plaintiffs were unconstitutional).
52. See, e.g., Roberts, 239 F.3d at 110 ("[W]e consider [strip] searches an 'extreme intrusion
on personal privacy and 'an offense to the dignity of the individual' . . . ." (quoting Wood v.
Clemons, 89 F.3d 922. 928 (1st Cir. 1996))): Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 395 (10th Cir.
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C. Holding and Analysis
1. Holding
Writing for the Court in Florence, Justice Kennedy limited the scope of his
opinion to address "whether every detainee who will be admitted to the general
population may be required to undergo a close visual inspection while
undressed." 54 The Court then weighed the competing interests: the individual's
right to privacy and the state's interest in safe correctional facilities.5
Florence argued that detainees not arrested for or convicted of serious crimes
or offenses involving weapons or drugs should be exempt from invasive
searches, unless the officers have reason to suspect that they are smuggling
contraband. The State of New Jersey maintained that visual inspections are the
only realistic way to uncover contraband, spot contagious diseases visible on
skin, and identify possible gang allegiances. Furthermore, the State argued that
the officials responsible for the daily operations of the jails, not the judiciary, are
better suited to determine the policies concerning detention centers.
In a split decision (3-1-1-4),59 the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Third Circuit and indirectly upheld the decision in Bell v. Wolfish.60 The

1993) ("It is axiomatic that a strip search represents a serious intrusion upon personal rights.");
Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272 (adopting the opinion that "strip searches involving the visual
inspection of the anal and genital areas [are] 'demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating,
terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and submission..."
(quoting Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486, 491 (E.D. Wis. 1979))).
53. See Stanley v. Henson. 337 F.3d 961. 966-67 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding a clothing
exchange program that required inmates to disrobe in front of same-sex officers and put on jailimposed garments); Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (overruling
its prior decision requiring reasonable suspicion for strip searches). Although it could be argued
that a circuit split had developed, given the fact-specific nature of this issue, eight cases are
certainly not dispositive on this point.
54. Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1513 (2012) (emphasis added).
55. See generally id. at 1515-23 (balancing the state's interest of maintaining safety and
order in correctional institutions with an individual's constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures).
56. Id. at 1518.
57. See id. at 1520.
58. As stated by the Supreme Court in Florence III, "[t]he task of determining whether a
policy is reasonably related to legitimate security interests is 'peculiarly within the province and
professional expertise of corrections officials."' id. at 1517 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
548 (1979)), and "in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials
have exaggerated their response to these considerations courts should ordinarily defer to their expert
judgment in such matters," id. at 1517 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584 585 (1984))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id. at 1513. Some commentators speculate that if the facts were changed slightly, Alito
may have dissented and held that this search violated the Fourth Amendment, thus changing the
outcome. See Linda Greenhouse, 'Embarrass the Future', N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2012, 8:30 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytines.com/2012/04/04/embarrass-the-future/.
60. FlorenceIII, 132 S. Ct. at 1523.
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Court affirmed that a policy of no-contact strip-searching arrestees who are
admitted to the general jail population is reasonable and therefore does not
violate the Fourth Amendment as it is incorporated to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment. 61
Justice Kennedy's opinion did not mandate or ure the adoption of
suspicionless strip searches by state and local jurisdictions. Rather, the Court
suggested jail administrators may adopt a policy that requires all arrestees who
are committed to the general population of ajail to undergo visual strip searches
not involving physical contact by corrections officers ifthe administration can
show that this policy is a reasonable search policy furthering a legitimate (or
significant) state interest.63 The correctional officials and the police cannot
themselves decide to conduct suspicionless searches absent an existing policy. 64
2. Legitimate State Interests
In upholding the jail administrators' policies of searching all detainees at
intake, the Court balanced the detainee's right of privacy with the state's
interests.65 In Florence, predictability and efficiency are both provided as
support for a suspicionless standard. Ultimately, however, the safety of inmates
via the detection of contraband was found to be the primary interest rendering
the searches reasonable.68 Under the facts presented in Florence, the proposed
reasonable suspicion standard would be "unworkable." 69
a. Predictability
Before arriving at its conclusion, the Court addressed the problems with a
reasonable suspicion standard that could arise due to the fast and fluid nature of
the intake process. 0 Guards are often forced to make quick judgments to

61. Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
62. See id. at 1513-14.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 1517 (noting that precedent has allowed correctional officials to adopt
reasonable policies to detect and deter the smuggling of contraband).
65. See generally id. at 1515-23 (balancing the state's interest of maintaining safety and
order in correctional institutions with an individual's constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures).
66. See id. at 1520 (noting that adopting a reasonable suspicion standard may be unworkable
because "the seriousness of an offense is a poor predictor of who has contraband").
67. Id. at 1521 (noting that the "laborious administration of prisons would become less
effective, and likely less fair and evenhanded," if the reasonable suspicion standard was imposed).
68. See id. at 1518-20.
69. Id. at 1520.
70. See id. at 1516 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 529 (1984)) (recognizing "that
deterring the possession of contraband depends in part on the ability to conduct searches without
predictable exceptions").
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determine when an entering detainee's conduct warrants a strip search.' Other
factors typically considered in the reasonableness assessment are the nature of
the charge, the characteristics of the detainee, and the circumstances surrounding
the arrest.72
Leaving the strip search decision to a guard's often snap
determination of "reasonably suspicious" opens the door to discriminatory
application and the resulting threat of lawsuits.
If the court later decides there was not reasonable suspicion, the guard may
be subject to liability.7 Accordingly, officers might be inclined not to conduct a
thorough search in any close case in order to avoid liability, thus creating
unnecessary risk for the entire jail population. 5 If a guard determines that a
detainee is not suspicious, opts to forgo a strip search, and ends up being
mistaken, the consequences are dire. 6 The entire jail population-guards, other
inmates, and the detainee himself-are exposed to a facility ridden with
contraband and its concomitant threats. Suspicionless strip searches, the Court
instructed, avoid this problem by imposing a structure of predictability and
efficiency.
b. Efficiency
As the Court pointed out, "[guards] would be required, in a few minutes, to
determine whether any of the underlying offenses were serious enough to
authorize the more invasive search protocol."79
When determining one's
suspicion, the guard may use the type of offense for which the detainee was
arrested as one, if not the main, indicia of suspicion.so However, according to
the Supreme Court, "the seriousness of an offense is a poor predictor of who has
contraband and . .. it would be difficult in practice to determine whether

individual detainees fall within the proposed exemption."8 ' In addition, the
Court noted that "[e]ven if people arrested for a minor offense do not themselves
wish to introduce contraband into a jail, they may be coerced into doing so by
others."
Justice Kennedy explained that it is also difficult to classify inmates and
detainees by their current and prior offenses before the intake search process.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id. at 1522.
See Dobrowolskyj v. Jefferson Cnty. Ky., 823 F.2d 955, 957 (6th Cir. 1987).
Florence IIL 132 S. Ct. at 1522.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
FlorenceIII, 132 S. Ct. at 1522.
See id.
Id. at 1520.
Id. at 1521.
Id.
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A further impediment to using the type of offense as an indicator of suspicion is
that many officers who conduct the initial search do not have access to criminal
history records, and even if they do, the records are often "inaccurate or
incomplete." 84 At the outset. correctional officials know very little about an
arrestee, for many times inmates will carry false identification or lie about their
identity.
Furthermore, using the type of offense as an indicator of reasonable
suspicion creates the problem of where to draw the line as to what offenses
create reasonable suspicion. A formulaic approach that distinguishes between
felonies and misdemeanors or indictable and non-indictable offenses would still
create problems for a municipality, as arrestees with misdemeanor charges are
not always less threatening than their felon7 -charged counterparts." The Court
used the examples of Timothy McVeigh, 9 who was arrested hours after the
Oklahoma City bombing for driving without a license plate, and serial killer Joel
Rifkin,90 who was arrested for the same reason.
These two men rank as
infamous criminals in American history, yet both were originally detained as a
result of misdemeanor charges.92
Finally, the felony-misdemeanor framework "underestimates inmate
ingenuity."
Even if an individual arrested for a minor offense has no desire to
smuggle in forbidden items, he still may be pressured into doing so by others. 94
The Court stated that a rule "[e]xempting people arrested for minor offenses
from a standard search protocol thus may put them at greater risk and result in
more contraband being brought into the detention facility."95 Prisoners are adept
at learning the loopholes in the system and, once discovered, would be sure to

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 1520-22.
87. Brief for New Jersey County Jail Wardens Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at I I, 15, Florence III,
132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 3841659, at
*11. *15 [hereinafter New Jersey Wardens Brief].
88. See Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1520 ("People detained for minor offenses can turn out to
be the most devious and dangerous criminals.").
89. Timothy McVeigh was the convicted perpetrator of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, in
which 168 people died. Timothy Mc Veigh Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://wvv.biography.
com/people/timothy-moveigh-507562 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
90. Joel Rifkin was New York's "most prolific" serial killer, responsible for the deaths of
seventeen victims. Michael Newton. Joel David Rikin: New York's 1ost Prolific Serial Killer,
CRIME LIBRARY, http://www.trut.comi/library/crime/serial killers/predators/rifkin/1.html (last
visited Mar. 22. 2013). New York state troopers caught him driving without a license plate-a
minor offense. Id.
91. Florence III, 32 S. Ct. at 1520.
92. Id.
93. Christopher P. Keleher, Judges as Jailers: The Dangerous Disconnect Beteen Courts
and Corrections, 45 CREIGHTON L. REv. 87, 118 (2011).
94. FlorenceIII, 132 S.Ct. at 1521.
95. Id.
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exploit them.96 Any time a felon and a person convicted of a minor offense are
held in the same area (for instance a holding cell), the hardened criminal could
coerce the minor offender into smuggling in his contraband since he knows no
strip search will be performed.97
In summation, using the type of offense as indicia of suspicion appears
workable on the surface; however, in practice, relying on the type of offense
proves to be an unrealistic solution. 98 The Court suggested that a blanket strip
search policy is more efficient, because it eliminates the problems associated
with particularized suspicion.99
c.

Safety of Detainees Through DeterminingPossessionof
Contraband

The primary consideration of those operating prisons and jails is the safety
of the individuals in its confines.100 Contraband, in the form of weapons, drugs,
tobacco, or gum, arguably poses the most substantial threat to safety.o Strip
searches allow corrections officers a predictable and efficient means of detecting
and confiscating dangerous contraband.102
At present, no viable alternatives exist that accomplish precisely what a strip
search can.103 One item of technology that is repeatedly mentioned is the "BOSS
Chair," or the Body Orifice Scanning System. 04 In fact, this security method
was in place at the Essex County Detention Center in Florence.10 5 The chair is
"[a] non-intrusive scanning system designed to detect small weapons or
contraband metal objects concealed in oral, anal, or vaginal cavities."106 Though
less invasive than a strip search, "there is no evidence regarding the efficacy of
the BOSS Chair in detecting metallic objects." 1o Moreover, it cannot detect

96. Id. at 1517 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 529 (1984)).
97. Id. at 1521.
98. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
100. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817. 823 (1974) ("[C]entral to all other corrections goals is
the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves.").
101. Florence III1 132 S. Ct. at 1517, 1519 ("[C]orrectional officials must be permitted to
devise reasonable search policies to detect and deter the possession of contraband in their
facilities.").
102. Id. at 1520.
103. See, e.g., Brief of Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, Local 249 et al. at 10, Florence III, 132
S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 3808399, at *10 [hereinafter Brief of Policemen's
Benevolent Ass'n] (noting that "[t]he effectiveness of the [body orifice scanning system] ... is
questionable."). But see Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1528 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (identifying
alternative search methods that correctional facilities currently use and noting that "[n]o one here
has offered any reason, example, or empirical evidence suggesting the inadequacy of such practices
for detecting injuries, diseases, or tattoos.").
104. Florence II. 621 F.3d 296. 310 (3d Cir. 2010), af'd, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
105. Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1528 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106. FlorenceII, 621 F.3d at 310 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id.
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drugs and other non-metallic contraband.108 It also cannot discover contagious
skin infections, such as MRSA,io9 or gang affiliations. 0 Pat-down searches
would fail even more drastically for the same reasons.
Until some new
technology reaches the marketplace that can detect metal, cash, drugs, disease,
and gang affiliations, strip searches will continue to protect those in a corrections
facility.
111.

THE INCARCERATION NETWORK IN SOUTH CAROLINA

As mentioned in Part II, the issue confronting the Court in Florence
pertained to arrestees brought into a jail or detention center.112 In South
Carolina. jails and detention centers are operated by local j urisdictions; however,
the detention centers are required to meet the minimum standards outlined in
South Carolina Code sections 24-9-10 through 24-9-50. 11 If any facility does
not comply with the minimum standards established by the South Carolina
Association of Counties and adopted by the Department of Corrections, the
Director of the Department of Corrections may order that facility to be closed if
no corrective action is initiated within ninety days.114 All of the detention
centers must adhere to the baseline requirements but have wide latitude to
implement the policies to accomplish those purposes.
In addition to county detention centers, the South Carolina Department of
Corrections (SCDC) operates twenty-seven prisons throughout the state.116
While the SCDC prisons only house convicted felons and not pretrial
detainees," the issue in Florence arguably still applies, because the term "jail"

108. Id.
109. MRSA, or methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus, is a highly contagious "superbug,"
that if left untreated, can cause serious health problems including death. Brief of Policemen's
Benevolent Ass'n, supra note 103, at 12 13, 2011 WL 3808399, at *12-13. It is often detected by
the presence of "abscesses, cellutlitis, boils, carbuncles and impetigo." Id.
110. See. e.g., id. at 14 ("Visual inspections are vital to prevent inmates with contagious
diseases from entering the general prison population."); id. at 15 ("[C]orrections officers rely on
visual inspections to identify gang members aid keep them away from inmates aligned with rival
gangs.").
111. See id.
112. Email from Harry H. Stokes, Jr., Deputy Gen. Counsel, S.C. Dep't of Corr., to author
(Oct. 12, 2012, 15:59 EST) [hereinafter Stokes Email] (on file with author). The terms "jail" aid
"detention center" are used interchangeably.
113. Minimum Standards for Local Detention Facilities in South Carolina 1 (Dec. 19. 2006)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the South Carolina State Library) [hereinafter Minimurn
Standards], available at http://www.statelibrary.sc.go-/scedocs/C8174/000555.pdf.
114. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30(A)-(B) (Supp. 2012).
115. See Minimum Standards, supra note 113, at 4.
116. Institutions, S.C. DEP'T CORR., http://www.doc.sc.gov/institutions/institutions.jsp (last
visited Mar. 22, 2013).
117. Stokes Email, supra note 112. Inmates must have been convicted of an offense and
sentenced to a prison term of at least ninety-one days. Id.
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was used "in a broad sense to include prisons and other detention facilities." 8
Justice Kennedy further explained that "[t]he specific measures being challenged
will be described in more detail; but, in broad terms, the controversy concerns
whether every detainee who will be admitted to the general population may be
required to undergo a close visual inspection while undressed." 1 Therefore, if
the prison inniate is going to be admitted to the general population, Florence
likely would apply. Accordingly, the following discussion will highlight both
the local and state prison policies.
4. County Detention Centers
There are currently fifty-two detention centers in counties across the state.120
These facilities are classified into eight "types," designated by various factors
including length of stay, sentencing status, and age.
Each detention center can
establish and enforce a written plan that assigns its inmates to classified
categories for placement in the facility.12 The categories are based on
determinants including age, sex, behavioral habits, severity of crimes committed,
sentence status, and medical history. 123
As far as searches are concerned, the Minimum Standards manual sets forth
that in Type 11 facilities (and presumably higher level facilities as well) each
inmate will undergo a "[p]roper search" upon entering the detention center. 124In
addition to the search upon initial entry, officials also search the inmates upon
both leavin and reentering the confines of the facility regardless of their reason
for leaving. , While the Minimum Standards manual does not mandate the type
of search that must be conducted, the manual does specify that inmates must be
separated from the general jail population during the intake process. 126The

118. Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1513 (2012).
119. Id.
120. Jail Directoy, S.C. JAIL ADM'RS ASS'N, http://www.corrections.com/scjaa/docs!
Directory.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
121. Minimum Standards, supra note 113, at 5-6. A "Type I Facility" refers to facilities used
"for the temporary detention of persons wlio are being held wile awaiting a judicial hearing." Id.
at 5. However, if detainment will exceed forty-eight hours, he or she will be transferred to a Type IT
facility notwith stan ding a compelling reason not to do so. Id. A "Type 11Facility" is a city, county,
or multijurisdictional jail "which houses persons awaiting court action, inmates sentenced to three
(3) months or less, and civil contemptors." Id. "Type III" centers house "only sentenced adult
inmates." Id. Persons awaiting court action, those in civil contempt, inmates sentenced to three
months or less, and those with longer sentences under an agreement with the Department of
Corrections are confined to "Type IV" centers. Id. at 6. Finally, a "Type V Facility" is a
"work/punishment center, stand alone or otherwise, which houses sentenced inmates and civil
contemptors who are participating in community programs such as work release or education
release." Id Types VI. VII. and VIII are all centers forjuveniles. Id.
122. Id. at 25.
I23. Id.
124. Id. at 18.
125. Id. at 23.
126. Id. at 37.
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booking area, medical examination room, shower facilities, telephone facilities,
and similar areas are all to be apart from the general population.
In theory,
this means that the situation experienced by Albert Florence-getting searched
in front of other inmates 128-would not occur in a South Carolina detention
center.'
Because no definition of "proper search" is provided by the Minimum
Standards, county detention centers have broad discretion in determining its
meaning and implementation.
As a result, there is variability in the intake
procedures across the state.131 For the most part, the goal is to conduct a search
with "maximum respect and minimum physical discomfort to the inmate as
allowed by safety and security considerations."
At the Spartanburg County jail, a corrections officer will direct the entering
individual to empty his pockets and undergo a "pat-down" search for
weapons."
Strip searches are not normally conducted upon initial entry at this
facility, except when there is "probable [cause] that the individual has a weapon
and/or other contraband on his/her person based on the type [of] offense,
personal observation of officers and staff, previous history, and/or other valid
reasons."
If justified, the strip search must be done in private and by an
officer of the same sex.
At the opposite end of the state, the Beaufort County Detention Center takes
a similar approach.1 6 All inmates entering the facility are searched thoroughly
with a handheld metal detector to guarantee that no metal objects enter the
facility.
Inmates that arrive with drug trafficking charges are subjected to a
frisk search, as well as an additional strip search if suspicion exists. 13 Law
enforcement officers can request a strip search of an individual they bring in, but
the officer must agree to sign a waiver to be kept on file at the Beaufort County
jail. 139

127. See id.
128. Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1514 (2012).
129. Minimum Standards, supra note 113, at 37.
130. See id. at 4.
131. See e.g., Email from Melissa Thomley, Sergeant, Hill-Finklea Det. Ctr., to author (Oct.
26, 2012, 16:19 EST) [hereinafter Thornley Email] (on file with author) (discussing procedure of
performing unclothed searches before placing inmates in the general population); Email from Jeff
Vortisch, Office of Prof'1 Standards, Beaufort Cnty. Det. Ctr., to author (Oct. 18, 2012, 13:32 EST)
[hereinafter Vortisch Email] (on file with author) (outlining intake procedures which involve
thorough frisk searches and use of metal detectors).
132. Processing, CHARLESTON CNTY. S.C. ONLINE, http://www.coso.charlestoncounty.org/
index3.asp?p=/det-processing.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
133. Intake Iniomnation, SPARTANBURG CNTY. DET. FACILITY, http: /wway.spartanburgcounty
jail.org/intake/intake.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Vortisch Email, supra note 131.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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As a final example, the Berkeley County Detention Center conducts clothed
frisk searches on every entering arrestee.o 0 "Unclothed searches" occur when
an individual is booked for a weapons or drug charge or at the arresting officer's
request based upon reasonable suspicion.141 Additionally, strip searches occur
when an inmate is to be placed in the general population, analogous to the
procedures in Florence.142
The methods described above demonstrate the varying means used to reach
the same end. Interestingly, some county jails in South Carolina seem to be
applying their own versions of a "reasonable suspicion" standard, with or
without actually labeling it as such. 143
B. South CarolinaPrisons
The SCDC controls the prisons throughout the state.144 The prisons are
categorized by increasing level of security: minimum (level 1-B), medium (level
2 or L2), and maximum (level 3). 145 The level 3 facilities house violent
offenders and inmates who exhibit behavioral problems, and thus necessitate
high security.14 The level 2 and level 3 prisons utilize a blanket strip search
policy-inmates undergo a strip search whenever entering the institution,
whether for the first time or upon reentering after leaving. ' The minimum
security level inmates, by contrast, are not subjected to a strip search upon
entering the facility; a strip search will only be performed when they have left
the facility and are reentering. 1 8
Although there have been no cases to date related to issues with the
reasonable suspicion standard, that does not mean this approach is preferred over
a suspicionless search policy; there are arguments for and against both
approaches.149 The Supreme Court noted that "[t]hese cases establish that
correctional officials must be permitted to devise reasonable search policies to
detect and deter the possession of contraband in their facilities" 0 and that "in
the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials

140. Thornley Email, supra note 131.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 122 29 and accompanying text.
144. About SCDC, S.C. DEP'T CORR., http://www.doc.sc.goviabout sedc/aboutjsp (last
visited Mar. 22, 2013).
145. Institutions, S.C. DEP'T CORR., supra note 116.
146. Id.
147. S.C. DEP'T OF CORR., No. OP-22.19, OPERATIONS MANUAL: SEARCHES OF INMATES
§ 4.2 (Nov. 1. 2006).
148. Id.
149. See infia Parts IV and V.
150. Florence 11, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517 (2012) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546
(1979)).
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have exaggeratedtheir response to these considerationscourts should ordinarily
defer to their expert judgment in such matters."'15
In Florence. it was reasonable tinder the conditions in those facilities for the
administration to adopt a strip search policy for all detainees.152 However, the
determination of whether it would be a reasonable or an "exaggerated response"
to implement a suspicionless strip search policy in a South Carolina facility is
not as simple.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY FOR IMPLEMENTING SUSPICIONLESS STRIP SEARCHES IN
SOUTH CAROLINA

In Florence, the Supreme Court articulated the reasons why jail officials
could deem a reasonable suspicion standard unworkable in the Burlington
County and Essex County facilities.4 This Part extends those arguments to the
jails in South Carolina.
A.

Identification of Security Threats

The opening line of Justice Kennedy's opinion states that "[c]orrectional
officials have a legitimate interest, indeed a responsibility, to ensure that jails are
not made less secure by reason of what new detainees may carry in on their
bodies." 1 This need for security is trifold: to protect facility staff, the existing
detainee population, and the new detainee.
Prevention of contraband is the
first of many measures in place to provide security.157
1.

Contraband

According to South Carolina Regulation 33-1, "contraband" is "[a]ny item
which was not issued to the prisoner officially or which can be purchased" in the
jail canteen.
Weapons of any kind, drugs, alcoholic drinks or liquids
containing alcohol, keys and locks, tools, and money in any denomination are
the basic prohibited items.159 Some jails have specified additional items that are
disallowed. 160 For example, the Spartanburg County Detention Center bans

151. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Block v. Rutherford. 468 U.S. 576. 584-585 (1984))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
152. See id. at 1523.
153. See infra Part V.
154. Florence III1 132 S. Ct. at 1520 23.
155. Id. at 1513.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1517.
158. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 33-1 (2011).
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., FrequentlyAsked Questions - Detention, ANDERSON S.C. POLICE DEP'T. http://
www.andersonpd.com/faq-detention.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (stating that cigarettes and
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"chewing gum, chewing tobacco, and snuff."i61 Something as innocent as a
toothbrush or pen can be sharpened into a weapon, bobby pins and hairpins can
open handcuffs, and cigarettes and matches can start fires. 2 The necessity of a

visual strip search to identify these often-overlooked items cannot be overstated.
The first concern is the safety of the guards and other prison staff. For
example. the Charleston County Detention Center offers "[d]irect supervision

housing," which consists of cells arranged around a common area with an officer
stationed inside the unit to interact with the inmates and maintain security.163
Unlike traditional designs, this type of housing provides no isolated control
booth for the supervising officer and puts no physical barriers between the
guards and the inmates. 64 Charleston County is not alone; Beaufort County also
operates as a direct supervision facility. 6 According to the Beaufort County
web site, an "officer oversees the day-to-day activities of up to 56 persons by
him or herself." 166 Given the extent to which officers are outnumbered and the
lack of secure barriers, correctional officers would be at a severe disadvantage if
contraband entered the jail environment and a fight erupted or an assault
occurred.167 The Supreme Court pointed out that this fear is legitimate, because
"[i]nmates commit more than 10,000 assaults on correctional staff every
year."168 A suspicionless strip search policy in South Carolina would help in
reducing such risks, ensuring that the protection of the detention center personnel
is at the forefront.
The safety of other inmates presents another concern. Certain jails around
the state house hundreds to thousands of individuals on any given day. 169
Additionally, some jails around the state have seen a growth in the number of

lighters are considered contraband); Frequently Asked Questions, KERSHAW CNTY. S.C..
http://www.kershaw.sc.gov/Tndex.aspx'page=208 (follow "Frequently Asked Questions brochure"
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (providing that smoking materials are treated as contraband).
161. Contraband, SPARTANBURG CNTY. DET. CTR., http://www.spartanburgeountyjail.org/
contraband/contraband.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
162. Florence III, 132 S.Ct. at 1519 (quoting New Jersey Wardens Brief, supra note 87, at 8
9, 2011 WL 3841659, at *8-9).
163. Main Housing, CHARLESTON CNTY. S.C. ONLINE., http:// www.ccso.charlestoncounty.org/
index3.asp?p=/det-housing.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
164. Id.
165. Information of Interest, BEAUFORT CNTY. S.C., http://www.begov.net/departments/publicsafety/detention-center/infornation-of-interest.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
166. Id.
167. Brief of Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, supra note 103, at 10, 2011 V 3808399, at*10.
168. FlorenceIII, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 1519 (2012).
169. See, e.g., Detention andJudicialServices. LEXINGTON CNTY. SHERIFF S.C., http://www.lex
-co.com/sherift divisions.aspx?did=de (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (stating that the average daily
population is 950, with a record number of 1,012); Statistics, BEAUFORT CNTY. S.C.,
http://www.begov.net/departments/public-safety/detention-ceiiter/stats.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2013)
(stating that the average daily population is 223).
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average inmates. 0 In Anderson County, for example, there has been a rapid
increase in the average daily population since 2001.
Specifical , the average
daily population increased nearly 100% over a six-year period.
Even more
disconcerting, the Anderson County jail is understaffed by sixteen officers. 73
When such a shortage of officers exists, heightened measures taken upon entry
could be deemed reasonable to ensure that no contraband enters. As opposed to
other methods, such as the BOSS Chair,174 strip-searching all entering inmates is
a proven wxay to locate forbidden objects and better guarantee adequate
protection. 175
The third consideration is the security of the new detainee. Entering inmates
who are first-time offenders and new to the detention center environment are not
yet accustomed to the unspoken rules of the jail, and thus are at an increased risk
when compared to other hardened criminals and repeat offenders.
Contraband
must be prevented in order to stop further victimization of new detainees.
In addition, some counties have extremely large prison populations.' 8 For
example, Charleston County had an average daily population of 1,451 in 2012.179
While this number is a decrease from prior years, when the average hovered
around 1,700, a substantial threat exists when a new detainee is exposed to a
general population of that size. 1 SOOne way to reduce the threat of violence is to
identify contraband at the outset via a strip search.

170. See, e.g., Detention Center Quick Facts. ANDERSON CNTY. SHERIFF'S OFFICE, http://
detention.andersonsheriff.info/servicedet.asp?id=2 (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) ("Since 2001, there
has been a rapid increase in the Average Daily Population of the Detention Center.").
17 1. Id.
172. Id. (showing an increase in the average daily population from 220 in 2000 to 434 in
2006).
173. Anderson County Detention Center Goals and Objectives 2011 2012, ANDERSON CNTY.
SHERIFF'S OFFICE, http://detention.anidersonsheriff.info/servicedet.asp'id=8 (last visited Mar. 22,
2013).
174. See Brief of Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n. supra note 103, at 10, 2011 WL 3808399, at
*10.
175. See id. at 18 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979)).
176. See Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris Crty., Tex., 406 F. Supp. 649, 691 (S.D. Tex. 1975)
("Exposure to persons with extensive criminal backgrounds can harm first offenders and other
inmates who enter the system with little propensity for future criminal conduct and are prime
candidates for rehabilitation."); see also Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1521 (2012) (discussing
coercion by hardened criminals to force new detainees to smuggle contraband into the detention
centers).
177. See Florence III1 132 S. Ct. at 1521.
178. See, e.g., P.J. TANNER & S. MENDOZA, BEAUFORT CNTY. SHERIFF'S OFFICE, SOUTH

CAROLINA PROPOSAL 287(G) PROGRAM 9 (2008). available at http:/vwww.beso.net/blog/SC
Proposal278gProgram.pdf (noting that in 2008 the detention center in Richland County had an
average daily population of 1,148).
179. SheriffAl Cannon Detention Center y4verage Daily Population,CHARLESTON CNTY. S.C.
ONI fN E, http://www.ceso.charlestoncounty.org/pages/det-stats.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
180. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
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Gang Affiliations

While contraband prevention remains the most noted element of security,
strip searches also identify gang affiliations via gang tattoos or branding.18 1 A
"criminal gang" refers to a "formal or informal ongoing organization,
association, or group that consists of five or more persons who form for the
purpose of committing criminal activity and who knowingly and actively
participate in a pattern of criminal gang activity."l82 In other words, gangs are
groups of individuals who "claim control over certain territories and engage in
illegal behavior." 18 3 Often volatile and unpredictable individuals, gang
participants commit "acts of violence toward rival gang members or the general
public for even minor infractions of their code." 84
The issues that gangs present to the public in general are magnified in the
confines ofa jail.185 Rivalries between opposing gang members create a climate
of tension and coercion, causing other inmates to feel the need to arm
themselves. 186
Furthermore, gangs put an entire facility at risk by

"orchestrat[ing] thefts, commit[ting] assaults, and approach[ing] inmates in
packs to take the contraband from the weak." 8 7
The Supreme Court noted that "[j]ails and prisons ... face grave threats
posed by the increasing number of gang members who go through the intake
process." 88 In South Carolina, gang rates are on the rise as well. 9 According
to one news source, "All indicators demonstrated a statewide growth in gang
activity and membership. The rate of gang violence increased 90 percent
between 1998 and 2007. Data supports the number of gang murders increased
from zero reported in 1998 to 21 reported in 2007."i90 In July 2012, thirty-one
individuals were arrested in Richland County due to their involvement with the

181. Florence HL1,132 S. Ct. at 1519.
182. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-8-230(2) (Supp. 2012).
183. Anderson County Gang Task Force, ANDERSON CNTY. SHERIFF'S OFFICE, http://special
ops.an dersonsheriff.info/'servicedet.asp'id=6 (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
184. Id.
185. See New Jersey Wardens Brief, supra note 87, at 7, 2011 WL 3841659, at *7.
186. Florence 1H, 132 S. Ct. at 1518 (quoting PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE
AND THEORY 462 (Peter M. Carlson & Judith Simon Garrett eds., 2d ed. 2008)).
187. Id. at 1519 (quoting New Jersey Wardens Brief, supra note 87, at 9-10, 2011 WL
3
841659, at *9-10).
188. Id. at 1518.
189. See Report Reveals Gang Violence on the Rise in SC, WMBF NEWS, http://www.wmbf
news.com/Globalistory.asp?S 11649605 (last updated Jan. 29, 2010. 1:51 PM).
190. Id.
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gang known as the "United Blood Nation."191 In order to combat this Frowing
threat, some counties in South Carolina have developed gang task forces.
The harsh reality remains that when detained, these gang members pose a
real security threat to detention center populations. 193 While "[tWhere are gangs
exclusive to Black members, Hispanics, Asians and Whites .... [t]here are also
a number of gangs that cross racial boundaries."l94 Many of these gangs use
tattoos or other branding marks to indicate gang membership. 195 The primary
method of identifying and monitoring gang affiliations is through stripsearching.196
3. Health Concerns
The final way strip searches enhance detention center security is through the
identification of contagious infections.
Visually searching a detainee's
unclothed body enables corrections officers to locate cuts and wounds that may
have been incurred during the arrest process.' 8 It also allows guards to discover
possible diseases like MRSA.'9 Without detecting these problems at the intake
stage, the health of other inmates and jail officials is unnecessarily risked.200
B.

Unifrn Implementation

The second advantage of a policy requiring blanket strip searches of
individuals being admitted to the general population is uniformity across the
state. Currently, the only rule for local jurisdictions is that searches must be
"proper."2ol Each county facility can determine what exactly "proper" requires
or entails.202 Some of the detention centers in the state only perform a search if
the entering individual gives an official or officer "reasonable suspicion."203 In

191. John Monk. 31 Alleged Blood M1enbers Arrested in Latest Columbia Crackdown. TE
STATE, July 12, 2012, available at http://www.thestate.com/2012/07/12/2349832/dozens-ofcolumbians-aiiested.htmlI.UOhiC28zO8A.
192. See, e.g., Anderson County Gang Task Force, ANDERSON CNTY. SHERIFFS OFFICE,
supra note 183 ("The Gang Task Force was formed for an immediate response to a rise in gang
violence .... ).
193. See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text.
194. Anderson County Gang Task Force, ANDERSON CNTY. SHERIFF'S OFFICE, supra note
183.
195. See FlorenceIII, 132 S. Ct. at 1510, 1519 (2012).
196. Brief of Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, supra note 103, at 15, 2011 WL 3808399, at *15.
197. FlorenceIII, 132 S. Ct. at 1518.
198. See id.
199. Brief of Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, supra note 103, at 11-12, 2011 WL 3808399. at
*11-12.

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 12.
Minimum Standards, supra note 113, at 18.
See id. at 4.
See supra notes 130-41 and accompanying text.
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some jails, an arrestee with a drug charge is reasonably suspicious;204 in other
jails, drug and weapons offenses provide reasonable suspicion.205
The area of the state one is in at the time of the arrest should not determine
whether one will receive a strip search. Furthermore, a blanket suspicionless
strip search policy would provide individuals with constructive or inquiry notice
of what to expect when they enter a facility, rather than surprising and
distressing them during the intake process.206 While there is no way to
determine if knowledge of an impending strip search will act as a deterrent to
committing a crime, it is not hard to fathom that uniformity across jurisdictions
could increase consistency and stability.207
C. Administrative Ease
Security and uniformity are not the only benefits of a blanket policy; this
approach would also provide administrative ease for detention center staff. As
recognized by the Supreme Court, there are countless difficulties associated with
administering a reasonable suspicion standard. 208 Deciphering the definition of
"suspicious" and attempting to draw the line by type of offense appear to offer
solutions but in actuality only create more problems.209 The stressful and often
challenging determinations by the corrections officers at intake would be
eliminated entirely with a blanket policy that everyone would be searched. In
conclusion, a blanket policy offers easier administration and effectively prevents
inconsistent application.
V. PUBLIC POLICY FOR NOT ADOPTING SUSPICIONLESS STRIP SEARCHES IN
SOUTH CAROLINA

While arguments exist favoring the adoption of suspicionless strip
searches,210 such a move may not be reasonable in South Carolina detention
centers based on several factors, including population, number of inmates, and

204. See, e.g., Vortisch Email, supra note 131 ("Inmates that arrive with drug trafficking
charges are subject to ... an additional strip search if needed.").
205. See, e.g., Thornley Email, supra note 131 (describing Hill-Finklea Detention Center's
policy of performing unclothed searches of new detainees wlio are booked on weapons or drug
charges).
206. See 66 Am. JUR. 2D Records and Recording Laws § 75 (2011) ("There are two types of
constructive notice: notice arising from documents and instruments filed with a county recorder
pursuant to a recording statute and inquiry notice arising from knowledge of certain facts that
should impart to a person, or lead him or her to, knowledge of an ultimate fact." (citing First Am.
Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 837-38 (Utah 1998))).
207. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State
Laws. 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 138-39 (1996) (listing the economic costs reduced by uniformity of
law s).
208. See FlorenceIII, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1522 (2012).
209. See id.
210. See supra Part IV.
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average length of sentences. The Supreme Court cautioned that while the
corrections officials' determination to use strip searches was reasonable in

Florence, in some instances, a policy of suspicionless strip searches would be an
exaggerated response to the circumstances.2 11 Given that the reasonableness
standard currently in use is arguably working and one reason jail officials would
alter procedures now is because Florence said they may be able to, a sudden
212
adoption of a blanket strip search standard would be an exaggerated response.
Furthermore, South Carolina's state constitution grants its citizens an explicit
right to privacy. 213 Although strip searches may be constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 214 the same may not be
true under the South Carolina Constitution. 2 15
Finally, public policy
considerations favor keeping a reasonable suspicion standard over adopting a
blanket approach.
4.

4 Working Standard

Many jails in states throughout the country, from Rhode Island to Oklahoma
to Idaho, impose a strip search on every arrestee regardless of suspicion.216
However, nothing in the Supreme Court opinion mandates the implementation of
a suspicionless strip search policy. 2 The holding in Florence was fact specific:
at the Burlington County and Essex County facilities, the respective policies of
the corrections officials were found to be reasonably related to the justifying
"penological interest," after analyzing the jails' compositions and the present
security threats. 8
South Carolina presents a different situation. A jail in rural South Carolina
does not necessarily encounter the same regular security threats as a jail in urban
New Jersey.219 Additionally, jails in South Carolina house smaller populations

211. Florence I, 132 S. Ct. at 1518 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584-585
(1984)).
212. See id.
213. S.C. CONST. art. I. § 10.
214. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979) (upholdinga prison's strip search policy as
not violating the Fourth Amendment).
215. See State v. Forrester. 343 S.C. 637, 645, 541 S.E.2d 837, 841 (2001) ("The South
Carolina Constitution. with an express right to privacy provision included in the article prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures, favors an interpretation offering a higher level of privacy
protection than the Fourth Amendment.").
216. FlorenceIII, 132 S. Ct. at 1517.
217. Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
218. See id. at 1527 28.
219. See Bilal R. Muhammad, Rural Crime and Rural Policing Practices (Multi Cultural Law
Enforcement) 7-8 (2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:/,vwwv.enich.edu/cems/
dow nloads/papers/PoliceStaff/Patrol,%/200perations, 0 fTactics/RURAL% 2OPOLICING.pdf ("The
belief that crime is less frequent in rural areas is supported by recent Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)
data that present crime by type and population group. [For example.] Index offence rates, including
homicide, are higher for urban areas than for rural areas.").
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than other states in our region.220 For example, the Abbeville County Detention
Center can only house 105 inmates and the Anderson County Detention Center
22 1
only houses approximately 400 inmates.
Moreover, it is not uncommon in
South Carolina for the composition of a jail, unlike a state prison, to consist
primarily of minor offenders.
To illustrate, 79.38% of inmates at the Beaufort
23
County Detention Center are pretrial detainees2.
These offenses can range
from underage possession of alcohol to failure to pay child support-not the
typical offenses that come to mind as justification for a strip search.
Adopting suspicionless strip searches in facilities throughout the state (even
in the larger centers such as those in Richland County and Charleston County)
likely would require more officers to be hired to conduct the searches. As
discussed previously, county detention centers are understaffed.
Requiring
additional staff members to perform the searches could impose significant
financial burdens on these counties. If jails in South Carolina are already
experiencing regular staffing difficulties, how are they to be expected to finance
an increase in personnel to accomplish a blanket search policy?
If South Carolina chooses to retain a standard based on reasonable suspicion,
it would not be alone.226 Many large and prominent facilities continue to use a

reasonable suspicion standard before strip-searching inmates entering the general
jail population, despite present "penological interests."22 7 The United States
Marshals Service, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Bureau of

220. LA. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL OFFICE, FISCAL AFFAIRS & GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
COmm.,

ADULT CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS

14 (2011), available at http://www.slcatlta.org/

Publications/cdrs/2011/2011 CDR CORRECTIONS.pdfgsearch="adult corrections report" [hereinafter
ADULT CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS].
221. ABBEVILLE CNTY. DET. CTR., http:/nenbers.tripod.com/~acso leva/index-dc.html (last
visited Mar. 22, 2013); Detention Center Quick Facts, ANDERSON CNTY. SHERIFFS OFFICE, Supra
note 170.
222. See ADULT CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS, supra note 220, at 96; S.C. DEP'T OF CORR.,
PROFILE OF INMATES IN INSTITUTIONAL COUNT 1 (2012), available at http://www.doc.sc.
gov/research!TinmatePopulationStats/ASOF InstitutionalCountProfile FY12.pdf.
223. Statistics.BEAUFORT CNTY. S.C., http://www.begov.net/departments/public-safety/detentioncenter/stats.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
224. See FlorenceIII, 132 S. Ct. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
225. See, e.g., supra note 173 and accompanying text (noting that the Anderson County
Detention Center is understaffed by sixteen officers).
226. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-405(1) (2012) ("No person arrested for a traffic or
petty offense shall be strip searched ... unless there is reasonable belief that the individual is
concealing a weapon or controlled substance . . . ."); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-1(c) (West
2006) ("No person arrested for a traffic, regulatory, or misdemeanor offense ... shall be strip
searched unless there is a reasonable belief that the individual is concealing a weapon or controlled
substance."); IoWA CODE ANN.
804.30 (West 2003) ("A person arrested for a [minor offense]
shall not be subjected to a strip search unless there is probable cause to believe the person is
concealing a weapon or contraband."); KAN. STAT. ANN,. § 22-2521(a) (2007) ('No person detained
or arrested solely for. . . a traffic, regulatory or nonviolent misdemeanor offense shall be strip
searched unless there is probable cause to believe that the individual is concealing a weapon or
controlled substance.").
227. See Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1529 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Indian Affairs all continue to use a reasonable suspicion standard.
If these
facilities, which are larger than even the largest South Carolina center, continue
to find the standard sufficient, surely it should suffice for a South Carolina
county.229 In addition to other facilities, at least ten other states disapprove of
performing suspicionless strip searches on minor offenders and forbid the
practice by statute.230 Three of these are also states that have explicit rights to
privacy in their constitutions.231
In South Carolina, specifically, there is little evidence indicating that the
reasonable suspicion standard employed is not working; on the contrary, national
statistics indicate that a reasonable susicion standard works just as efficiently as
a suspicionless strip search standard.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer
found it telling that the majority could not supply an example of any instance in
which contraband was found on an individual through an inspection of their
private parts that could not have been found under a policy requiring reasonable
suspicion.
The dissent cited a particular study of 75,000 new inmates over a
span of five years who received a suspicionless strip search. 34 Of the 75,000,
only sixteen of the searches yielded a discovery of contraband.235 A pat-down or
a search of outer clothing could have detected the contraband in thirteen of those
sixteen searches.236
In the remaining three instances, which contained
contraband in a body orifice, there was a drug charge or felony history that
would have justified a strip search on particularized reasonable suspicion.
In
summation, little proof exists to establish that a suspicionless strip search
exceeds the benefits of a reasonable suspicion standard.
B. The Right to Privacy
Following the holding in Florence, South Carolina facilities could
implement a blanket strip search policy under the United States Constitution for

228. Id.
229. Compare Fact Sheet: Detention Management, IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENT.
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detention-ngnt.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (noting
that the average combined daily population of all ICE detainees is 33,330), with Sherif Al Cannon
Detention Center Average Daily Population, CHARLESTON CNTY. S.C. ONLINE, Supra note 179
(noting that the average daily population of the detention center in Charleston County is 1451).
230. FlorenceIII, 132 S. Ct. at 1529 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
231. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; ILL. CONST. art. I, 6; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
232. Florence 111, 132 S. Ct. at 1528-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 1530.
234. Id. at 1528 29 (citing Brief for National Police Accountability Project as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 10, Florence III1 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 2623450,
at *10 [hereinafter National Police Accountability Project]).
235. Id. at 1529 (citing National Police Accountability Project, supra note 234, at 10, 2011
WL 2623450, at *10).
236. Id.
237. Id. (citing National Police Accountability Project, supra note 234, at 10. 2011 WL
2623450, at *10).
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all entering inmates and detainees in county detention centers, provided the
facilities demonstrate that a suspicionless policy is a reasonable response to the
existing circumstances.238 However, unlike the United States Constitution, the
South Carolina Constitution contains an explicit right to privacy, especially in
the context of searches and seizures.239 Article 1, section 10 states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and
unreasonableinvasions ofprivacy shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, the person or thing
to be seized, and the information to be obtained.240
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants no such
privacy right, simply stating, "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated .... 24
The plain difference in language-the explicit
right in article 1, section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution versus the implied
"penumbra" of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 42
supports the inference that the right to privacy created by the former is broader
than that offered by the latter.
Case law in South Carolina supports this argument. In State v. Weaver,243
the South Carolina Supreme Court stated, "By articulating a specific prohibition
against 'unreasonable invasions of privacy,' the people of South Carolina have
indicated that searches and seizures that do not offend the federal Constitution
may still offend the South Carolina Constitution."244 The South Carolina
Supreme Court in State v. Forrester expanded on this notion, recognizing that
"many of the states that have adopted explicit state constitutional right to privacy
provisions have read their constitutions as applying protection above and beyond
the protection provided by the federal Constitution." 4 The court in Forrester
also found it noteworthy that "[t]en states have express right to privacy
provisions in their constitutions. South Carolina and five other states have [that]

238. See id. at 1517 (majority opinion) (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 584-85
(1984)).
239. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10.
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
242. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 85 (1965) (explaining that
"the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance." and noting the "many controversies over these penumbral rights of
'privacy and repose.").
243. 374 S.C. 313, 649 S.E.2d 479 (2007).
244. Id. at 322, 649 S.E.2d at 483 (citing State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637. 644. 541 S.E.2d
837, 841 (2001)).
245. Forrester.343 S.C. at 645. 541 S.E.2d at 841.
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right to privacy provision included in the section prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures." 46
The dicta in both Weaver and Forrestercreate a compelling argument that
South Carolina citizens are given greater privacy protection, even though the
situations in the two cases are not analogous with Florence.247 Wfeaver
concerned a police officer's warrantless search of the defendant's car,248 and
Forrester dealt with a police officer searching and seizing the clutch of an
individual outside of a Burger King and discovering crack cocaine. 2 However,
Florence dealt with the strip search of a detainee entering a federal correctional
250
facility.
In fact, there is no South Carolina case specifically relating to the
privacy rights of inmates or detainees being searched. However, in view of the
fact that South Carolina affords its citizens greater privacy rights when their
purses or cars are being searched, it follows that South Carolina courts will give
more privacy rights regarding body cavities.2
The lack of judicial
interpretation regarding the right's scope in an incarceration context leaves open
the possibility that a challenge to the state constitutionality of strip searches may
not yield the same result as under the United States Constitution. In other words,
what survives a constitutional challenge federally may not mirror what survives
locally. 2
In addition to the inferences to be drawn from Weaver and Forrester,the
explicit vocabulary, in combination with the placement of the term "privacy,"
253
suggests that South Carolina values personal autonomy for its residents.
The
emphasis on personal autonomy is also evidenced by South Carolina's
requirement to separate a detainee or inmate from other prisoners during the
admissions process.254 In this respect, the policies in South Carolina detention
centers suggest respect for the individual.
The prison environment carries with it many threats 2 that restrict, but do
not destroy, the argument for greater privacy. protection. The notion that privacy
rights decline upon entering prison is widely accepted.256 As the Court noted in

246. Id at 644. 649 S.E.2d at 841 (citing ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. 11, § 8;
CAL. CONST. art, I. § 1; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23, HAW. CONST. art, I. § 6:;
ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6:LA.
CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, 7).
247. See Weaver, 374 S.C. at 321 22, 649 S.E.2d at 483; Forrester, 343 S.C. at 644-45, 541
S.E.2d at 840-41.
248. Weaver, 374 S.C. at 318, 649 S.E.2d at 481.
249. Forrester,343 S.C. at 640-41, 541 S.E.2dat 839.
250. FlorenceIII, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1514 (2012).
251. See supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
252. See Forrester,343 S.C. at 645, 541 S.E.2d at 841.
253. See id at 643-45. 541 S.E.2d at 840-41.
254. Minimum Standards, supra note 113, at 37.
255. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).
256. See id at 525 26 (noting that "privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply
cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal
institutions"), see also Florence 11. 621 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 2010). affd, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012)
(noting that "privacy is greatly curtailed by the nature of the prison environment").
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Hudson v. Palmer, 25 detention in a correctional facility "carries with it the
circumscription or loss of many significant rights."
The Third Circuit noted

that "[b]ecause privacy is greatly curtailed by the nature of the prison
environment, a detainee's Fourth Amendment rights are likewise diminished."259
While it is true that an arrestee's rights may certainly be "diminished,"

260
nowhere does the Court say this right is to be eliminated2.
On the contrary, the

Supreme Court has held that "[t]hose confined in prison retain basic
constitutional rights"261 and that "[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating

prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution."262 This is not what
occurred in Florence; the petitioner's right to privacy in essence vanished for the
sake of the state's interests. 263
Though searches upon entry are critical for ensuring safety and protecting
the health of everyone in the facility, is it necessary to reach the level of
undressing and getting completely naked? South Carolina's constitutional
privacy grant and the nature of South Carolina detention centers support an

answer in the negative. The fundamental right to privacy afforded to the state's
citizens warrants a less intrusive means of searching minor offenders in a
detention center.
C.

4n "ExaggeratedResponse"

Under the Florence standard, in a county permitting suspicionless strip
searches, an elderly man detained for driving with an inoperable headlight would
undergo the same routine "squat and cough" procedure as one entering for

murder charges.264

In a. county permitting suspicionless strip searches, a

nineteen-year-old college sophomore arrested for public intoxication would have
to strip into the nude and have her intimate body cavities searched. 265In a

county permitting suspicionless strip searches, an elderly nun arrested for
trespassing during an antiwar demonstration would be stripped and inspected
from head to toe, inside and out.266 Situations such as these are not imaginary or

257. 468 U.S. 517.
258. Id. at 524.
259. Florence II.621 F.3d at 301.
260. See Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1525 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987)).
261. Id. (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 545; Turner, 482 U.S. at 84).

262. Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 84).
263. See id. at 1526.
264. See id. at 1527.
265. See generallv id. (discussing examples of arrests for minor offenses that have led to fullbody strip searches).
266. See id. (citing Brief for Sister Bernie Galvin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,

at 6, Florence Ill, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No. 10-945). 2011 WL 3017402, at *6).
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merely hypothetical; rather, these situations occur often in counties with blanket
-- 267
strip search policies.
Strip searches involve an intrusion to one's personhood and an invasion of
one's autonomy.268 "Even when carried out in a respectful manner, and even
absent any physical touching," the practices are "inherently harmful, humiliating,
and degrading." 269 Justice Breyer's dissent in Florence points out that "the harm
to privacy ... [is] particularly acute where the person searched may well have no
expectation of being subject to a search, say, because she had sim~l' received a
traffic ticket . . . or because he had not previously paid a civil fine."
Not all individuals admitted to a jail are bad people; some people in society
are going to make mistakes and others may well be innocent, or at least not
guilty of the offense for which they are detained. Not surprisingly, some
271
entering arrestees in one South Carolina detention center are minor offenders.
These offenders are "stopped and arrested unexpectedly" and do not have the
time to hide contraband in their body cavities.
The "widespread advocacy'
and "widespread application" of a reasonable suspicion standard in many
271
detention centers reflects recognition of this point as valid2.
Is a policy of suspicionless strip searches in South Carolina really desirable?
Do we want our sons and daughters to be subjected to a strip search for a minor
offense. particularly given the realistic composition of our detention centers? In
South Carolina, adopting suspicionless strip searches would be an "exaggerated
response" to the realities of our jails. Because strip searches go beyond violating
privacy into invading one's personhood, these searches should not be tolerated in
South Carolina as a matter of public policy.
Additionally, not every strip search is constitutional.
Even though in
Albert Florence's situation the Court determined that the jails' policies were
reasonable and hence not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, there are
situations when strip searches could possibly be unreasonable. 2 Due to the
narrowness of the holding, certain "exceptions" have been contemplated to the
Florence rule.276
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts stated that the Court did
"not foreclose the possibility of an exception to the rule it announce[d]." 277
Justice Alito elaborated on this view, specifying specific instances that may

267. See generally id. (noting examples of strip searches for minor offenses).
268. See id. at 1526.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See Current Imnate Listing, DARLINGTON CNTY. DET. CTR., http://www.darcosc.com/
inmates/icurrent.htn (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (showing a wide array of offenses).
272. FlorenceIII, 132 S. Ct. at 1531 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
273. Id.
274. See id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
275. Id.
276. See id.
277. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
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qualify as an exception. 2 He suggested that arrestees whose detention had not
yet been reviewed by a magistrate or through other judicial review and who can
be held in available facilities removed from the general population may not be
subjected to suspicionless strip searches.2 79 For example, if it is possible to
segregate temporary detainees who are minor offenders from the general
population, then those arrestees may be eligible to avoid a strip search. 280
Although not explicitly referenced by the Supreme Court, incidents
involving touching were not considered when determining the constitutionality
of suspicionless strip searches.281 The constitutionality of searches amounting to
intentional humiliation also was not discussed.
In Afarzett v. Brown,2 83
although a Louisiana court did not agree that the plaintiff was intentionally
humiliated by a jail official, it recognized that there could be situations where
humiliation is possible.284 In those instances, the strip search is not necessarily
constitutional.
In summation, in situations where doing so would clearly shock the
conscience, local detention centers in South Carolina should refrain from
employing strip searches.
Furthermore, depending on the circumstances,
searches involving touching, humiliation, and a detainee that has not been before
a judge may not be upheld as reasonable.285 In consideration of the policy
arguments favoring the retention of the various reasonable suspicion standards in
South Carolina counties and evidence indicating current standards are working,
implementing suspicionless strip searches in this state would be an "exaggerated
response" and thus unconstitutional under the federal and state constitutions.
VI. CONCLUSION

In the wake of Florence, local detention centers throughout South Carolina
could implement a blanket strip search policy if they determined current
reasonable suspicion standards were no longer workable. There are arguments
for and against the implementation of this policy in detention centers, but
ultimately in South Carolina., it would not be reasonable to adopt a policy of
suspicionless searches for minor offenders.
The arguments in Florence, while reasonable according to the facts of the
case, are not entirely analogous to the centers in South Carolina that are, on
average, significantly smaller. Furthermore, the privacy grant in the South

278. See id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1523 (majority opinion) ("There also may be legitimate concerns about the
invasiveness of searches that involve the touching of detainees. These issues are not implicated on
the facts of this case, however, and it is unnecessary to consider them here.").
282. See id.
283. No. 11 2264, 2012 WL 4482941 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2012).
284. Id. at *4-5.
285. See Florence II, 132 S. Ct. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Carolina Constitution bestows upon its citizens a greater right than that afforded
under the United States Constitution. Though the prison environment curtails
this argument somewhat, nowhere does the Court suggest these rights are to be
eradicated completely; only diminished, at most. Finally, public policy supports
continued use of a reasonable suspicion standard in South Carolina.
Kara S. Grevey
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